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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of managerial ownership in relation to
agency theory in the Malaysian business environment. In addition to examining the total managerial
shareholdings, this study also investigates the association between direct and indirect managerial
shareholdings with agency costs.
Design/methodology/approach – The data for the study is obtained from two sources, namely
primary (questionnaire) and secondary (annual reports) data. The sample companies are 235 companies
listed on Bursa Malaysia for the financial year ended 2006. Multiple regression analysis is used to
estimate the relationship between the variables.
Findings – The results of the study indicate that managerial ownership in various segments has an
inverse relationship with total monitoring costs as predicted in agency theory. This finding is consistent
with earlier studies in western countries and supports the convergence of interest hypothesis.
Originality/value – This study gives a unique contribution to corporate governance studies relating
to the effect of ownership structure in relation to agency theory in Malaysian companies, one of the
countries in Asia. Previous studies claimed that it is unknown whether the agency theory findings in
western countries have equal impact in Asian organizations. Previous literature also indicates that there
is a possibility that given the cultural differences, the typical nature of agents in agency theory may not
be the case with regard to non-western countries. Thus, this study provides evidence that support prior
research findings in western countries relating to the effect of managerial ownership on the agency
relationship which is reflected in its agency costs.
Keywords Corporate ownership, Shareholders, Malaysia
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Corporate governance is a term often used to explain the processes and structures
used to direct and manage the business activities of a company in order to enhance its
shareholders’ wealth. Corporate governance has also attracted public interest in
the recent past because of its apparent important to companies and society. This is
evidenced in the 1997/1998 Asian financial crises and more recent global financial crises
(Rachagan, 2010). And, this governance issues once again come into attention after the
recent accounting irregularities in the USA (Ghosh, 2007).
Following the major corporate collapse and the effect of the crisis, efforts to enhance
corporate governance have been undertaken by countries around the world via the
establishment of corporate governance guidelines. Insufficient and malfunctioning
corporate governance mechanisms are said to be the major factors responsible
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for causing and accelerating the deteriorating situations of the crisis (Suto, 2003; Sam,
2007). Various internal and external monitoring mechanisms have been suggested, and
efforts are undertaken to improve these mechanisms. These mechanisms are claimed to
be able to align the interest of agents to be more closely with that of the principals (Sam,
2007).
Maijoor (2000) claims that corporate governance issues such as monitoring
mechanisms are very much related to agency theory. The theory postulates that the
separation of ownership and management functions lead to principal-agent conflicts as
the managers may pursue their own interest at the expense of the principals (Ugurlu,
2000; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). This divergence of interest
between managers and shareholders may create information asymmetry and result in
agency costs (Farrer and Ramsay, 1998). Several mechanisms have been suggested to be
used to reduce these costs. Among others is the convergence of interest model suggested
by Jensen and Meckling (1976). This model posits that as the agency costs arise as a
result of the separation of ownership and control, this cost would be zero if those who
owned the company also managed the company (Farrer and Ramsay, 1998). This can be
done by encouraging the managers to own the company’s shares, as the interest of the
internal and external shareholders are aligned.
Separation of ownership and control has long been recognized to potentially have an
adverse effect on the firm value. It is believed that the incentive to pursue personal
benefits increases when the manager owns a smaller portion of the firm’s shares
(Mat Nor and Sulong, 2007), and the incentive to invest in sub-optimal investments and
misappropriation of assets declines as a manager’s share ownership increases because
his/her share of a firm’s profit increases with ownership while benefits from perquisite
consumptions are constant (Ang et al., 2000; Fleming et al., 2005). It is claimed that when
managers own the shares of the firm, they have the incentive to increase the value of the
firm rather than shrink it, as they have vested interest in the company (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, as the owners are actively engaged in day-to-day
activities of the company (Niemi, 2005), there will be less information asymmetry, less
conflicts and less hierarchical organization structure. This less complex organization
structure reduces the need for assurance and monitoring and thus requires less
monitoring and agency costs.
Agency theory is also criticised for its ignorance of the existence of social relationship
and assumes social life is a series of contracts ( Johnson and Droege, 2004). It is unknown
whether the agency theory findings in western countries have equal impact in Asian
organizations (Ekanayake, 2004; Johnson and Droege, 2004). A limited prior study
suggests that agency effects are lower in Asia (Sharp and Salter, 1997). It is also claimed
that there is a limited empirical research that directly tests agency theory in different
culture context (Ekanayake, 2004). This study aims to provide evidence that supports or
rejects prior research findings in western countries relating to the effect of managerial
ownership on the agency costs in different agency setting.
Hence, this study attempts to investigate the agency relationship in Malaysian
organizations, one of the countries in Asia. Malaysia is a developing country, where it is
likely that its corporate governance practices are different from those practised in
developed countries such as the USA and Australia. In addition, prior studies also claim
that very little research has been done in less developed countries where their corporate




Besides, being a developing country with an emerging market, Malaysia is chosen in this
study because of its unique concentrated business environment. It is claimed that owner
managed firms are common among Malaysian companies (Mat Nor and Sulong, 2007).
Unlike companies with dispersed shareholdings, these companies are believed to have
reduced agency problem and agency costs due to a better match of control and cash flow
rights of the shareholders (Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006).
In Malaysia, corporate governance reforms have also been carried out because it also
has its share of corporate misconducts (Wan Hussin and Ibrahim, 2003; Sidhu, 2006).
In the aftermath of the crisis and accounting irregularities, the Malaysian government
has conducted extensive reforms in legal, regulatory and reporting framework relating
to shareholders rights, management oversights and other monitoring mechanisms
(Koh, 1999; Suto, 2003; Liew, 2007). Among others, the reforms include the amendments
to the Malaysian stock exchange’s listing requirements and the setting up of the
high-level finance committee of corporate governance to establish a framework for
corporate governance and set best practices to enhance the standards of corporate
governance. The committee released the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance
(the code) (FCCG, 2001) in March 2000, and was fully implemented in 2001. The code
introduces the principles and best practices of corporate governance to inculcate good
corporate governance among Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs). Among others
the code also highlights directorship, internal and external auditing as the important
monitoring mechanisms. Thus, the total of these costs, as recommended by the
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (FCCG, 2001) is used as a measurement for
agency costs in this study.
Specifically, this study focuses on the effect of managerial ownership on the agency
costs of Malaysian PLCs. This study investigates various ownership shareholdings,
which include direct, indirect and total managerial shareholdings and their effect
on monitoring costs. The results indicate that there are negative relationships between
all these managerial ownership variables and monitoring costs. These results are
consistent with prior studies in western countries. This is supported by the independent
t-test, which indicates that those companies having managerial ownership in their
organizations have significantly lower monitoring costs compared to those without such
holdings. Another t-test for those companies with low and high managerial ownership
also gives a similar result. The analysis relating to the board of directors’ shareholdings
and monitoring costs also show the same pattern of results.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the
relevant literature on the role played by managerial ownership in agency setting and
how it affects the agency costs, followed by research methodology and the results. The
paper ends with the conclusion of the research.
Literature review
A lot of previous studies examined the relationship between the use of control
mechanisms and their effect on the agency costs. The studies suggest various ways to
overcome the agency problem and reduce the costs involved. Among others, it is claimed
that managerial shareholdings can reduce and mitigate agency costs ( Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Ang et al., 2000; Chow, 1982; Fleming et al.,
2005; O’Sullivan, 2000). They argue that the agency costs of equity arise from the direct
expropriation of funds by the managers, consumption of excessive perquisites, shirking,
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sub-optimal investment and entrenching activities. Thus, earlier studies suggest that
managers are encouraged to own the organisations’ share to motivate management
monitoring (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Fleming et al., 2005). This is because the higher
the portion of the shares, the more responsible is the manager to increase the value of the
companies. According to original agency theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976), and
Fleming et al. (2005), equity agency cost is zero when there is a 100 per cent owned
manager organisation, and there is a positive relationship between equity agency costs
and the separation of ownership and control. As owner manager equity ownership
falls below 100 per cent, the equity ownership becomes relatively dispersed. In this
circumstance, the manager has a greater incentive for shrinking or the consumption of
excessive perquisites. This is due to the fact that although the firm’s value falls, the
managers only bear a portion of the expense related to their ownership stake (Farrer and
Ramsay, 1998). In other words, a lower managerial equity holding is associated
with lower incentive and effort exert by the managers in their responsibilities to seek
profitable investments. Chow (1982) suggests that when managers own a smaller equity
stake in their firms, they have an increased incentive to falsify financial disclosures,
since such disclosures are likely to be utilised by shareholders in setting managers’
remuneration. It is also suggested that managerial shareholdings help align the interests
of shareholders and managers in its convergence of interest hypothesis ( Jensen, 1993).
It is claimed that the higher the ownership of the firm by the management, the less the
conflicts among the stakeholders, the less the agency problem and cost associated with it
(Friend and Lang, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is because the insiders have
incentives to protect shareholders interests and need less supervision by the board, since
board activity is a costly monitoring alternative (Vafeas, 1999). It is also said that
increased agent ownership reduces the need for monitoring as the incentive alignment is
enhanced. The convergence of interest model suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976)
claim that an increase in the proportion of firm’s equity owned by insiders is expected to
increase firm value as the interest of inside and external shareholders are realigned, and
consequently there is a reduced need for intensive audit. O’Sullivan (2000) finds that
significant managerial ownership results in a reduced need for intensive auditing which
may be due to the merging functions of ownership and management, and consequently
minimize the monitoring motivation for audit. The auditors are also said to be less
inclined to undertake additional testing when managers are also significant equity
holders, since owner managers are less likely to deliberately mislead themselves
(O’Sullivan, 2000). Publicly traded firms in which top management has a larger
ownership stake experience corporate crime (proxy for agency cost) less frequently
(Alexander and Cohen, 1999). Managers also will have more powerful incentives to make
value maximising decisions about capital structure, as their stock ownership is high
(Berger et al., 1997). Besides, an increased incentive to maximise the firm value, holding
common stocks also motivates the managers for its underlying voting rights, such as an
increase in their influence on the board of directors and hence on the firm’s general policy
(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985). However, there are also studies, which suggest
contradictory and mixed findings such as Singh and Davidson (2003), who conclude
that managerial ownership does not serve as a significant deterrent to excessive
discretionary expenses which is used as a proxy for agency cost in their study.
Local studies on the association between managerial ownership and agency costs are




by non-executive directors effectively increases their incentives to monitor management
in ensuring that their wealth in the firms is intact. He finds that non-executives’ interests
are associated negatively with financial distress. However, Johari et al. (2008) in their
study of earning management among Malaysian listed companies finds that managerial
ownership is positively related to earning management practices. Their result suggests
that when managerial ownership is significant, it may induce managers to manage
earnings, that is, managers have more opportunities to make decisions that benefit
themselves at the expense of other stakeholders.
The association between managerial ownership and its effect on the firm has
also been studied internationally. Florackis (2008) in his study of the UK companies
reveals that managerial ownership is strongly associated with agency costs. His finding
suggests that managerial ownership encourages better used of assets in generating the
revenue of the companies. This notion is supported by McKnight and Weir (2009), who
find that increasing board ownership helps to reduce agency costs of the UK companies.
Another study by Yang et al. (2008), which uses Taiwanese listed firms, suggests that
equity owned by top management should be encouraged to reduce agency costs and
enhance the information content of earnings. However, a study by Pergola and Joseph
(2011) suggest that given sufficient equity ownership board members may entrench
where the decision that they make may not reflect and protect the interest of other
shareholders.
There are a number of literatures devoted to whether the mechanisms used to reduce
agency problems and its costs affect the firm value. It is assumed that if the agency costs
are reduced it will increase the firm value. Morck et al. (1988), Bhabra (2007), Benson
and Davidson (2009) and Jelinek and Stuerke (2009) find that managerial ownership is
nonlinearly related to agency costs and firm value. Bhabra (2007)’s study of New Zealand
companies finds curvilinear relationship of managerial ownership and firm value and
Benson and Davidson (2009) find a significant inverted u-shaped relationship between
managerial ownership and firm value. Morck et al. (1988) find a significant positive
relationship between firm value and ownership when board ownership is between 0 and
5 per cent and a significant negative relationship when board ownership is in the
5-25 per cent range.
In terms of managerial ownership structure’s association with another monitoring
mechanism, that is auditing, it is found that the lower the managerial share ownership in
a company, the greater the probability of the company being audited (Tauringana and
Clarke, 2000). Another study claims that agency theory suggests that in the absence of
regulation, the propensity of firms’ demand for independent audit is a function of the
extent of the divorce between ownership and control (Chan et al., 1993). This is supported
by Fan and Wong (2005), who claim that external auditors play a monitoring and
bonding role in order to mitigate the agency conflict between the controlling owners and
the outside investors.
It is also believed that in a manager-owned organization, managers may be excessively
risk averse (Fama and Jensen, 1983a), which may lead to their under-investment in risky
projects, or induce managers to pursue “safe” strategies (Loh and Venkatraman, 1993).
Francis and Wilson (1988) state that where the agency setting has low conflict among
contracting parties (such as a manager owned organization), lower quality and less
costly minimum compliance audits might be demanded from accounting firms with a
lower reputation for independence and competence. However, in the absence of manager
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ownership, owners tend to discount the value of their initial investment and lower
the management compensation. Managers then have an incentive to choose a higher
quality audit as a means of increasing their compensation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
This is supported by Firth and Smith (1992), who find that the lower the percentage share
of ownership that the management have in the company, the greater the demand for Big
Eight auditor (high-quality auditor). Consistently, diffusion of ownership increases the
cost and effort to affect management policy and to force a change in management. Francis
and Wilson (1988) suggest that higher quality audit can be considered as part of the
control system that mitigates the relative inability of diffused ownership to directly
control management action.
Research methodology
Data collection and sample selection
Data for the study was collected using primary and secondary sources. Primary data
was collected using cross-sectional surveys, which were sent to Malaysian PLCs. The
population of the study includes all companies listed on the main and second board
of Bursa Malaysia. However, the companies classified under the finance sector were
excluded in this study because of their unique features and business activities, as well as
differences in compliance and regulatory requirements (Yatim et al., 2006; Mat Nor and
Sulong, 2007). Questionnaires were sent to all 867 companies in the population as at
31 December 2006.
This questionnaire solicits information about the organisation specifically for the
financial year ended 2006. Once the questionnaires were returned, the annual reports of
those companies, together with the completed questionnaires were scrutinized for
further information to be used in the study. The secondary data was hand collected from
the companies’ annual reports, which were available at Bursa Malaysia’s web site (www.
bursamalaysia.com.my). The information gathered from the questionnaires was also
tabulated in the worksheet and further matched and validated with the information
obtained from the annual report. This will then address the reliability concern of
our survey data as conducted by Anderson et al. (1993) in their study of Australian
companies. Non-response bias was also conducted for the data collected from the
questionnaires.
After considering the incomplete and inconsistent questionnaires, there were
235 usable samples for the study, which represents 27.10 per cent of the total population.
The data were also inspected for outliers by means of standard regression diagnostics at
three standard deviations (Hair et al., 1998, p. 65). Normality check of the data was also
carried out and some of the measures were transformed into logarithm to control for
skewed nature of data. As multivariate regression is used to analyze the data in this
study, assumptions of multicollinearity, hemoscedasticity and linearity are also tested.
Variable measurements and model specifications
The dependent variable in this study is the monitoring costs of the companies in
Malaysian listed companies. Earlier studies use indirect measurement such as asset
utilization ratio (Florackis, 2008; Singh and Davidson, 2003), ratio of selling and
administration expenses to sales (Florackis, 2008; Singh and Davidson, 2003) and the ratio
of operating expenses to sales (Ang et al., 2000) as proxies for agency cost incurred by the




related to these firms in monitoring the shareholders’ wealth of their companies.
Directorship and auditing (internal and external) are specified as monitoring mechanisms
in the code (FCCG, 2001). Thus, the dependent variables in this study involve the costs of
these monitoring mechanisms demanded by the organisation in Ringgit Malaysia (RM).
However, as the executive directors are given the responsibilities to manage the
companies (management), and the non-executive directors are said to monitor and control
the opportunistic behaviour of the management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Haniffa and
Hudaib, 2006), this study does not include executive directors’ remuneration as monitoring
costs. Hence, total monitoring (MONITOR) is measured by the sum of organisation
investment in non-executive directors’ remunerations, internal and external auditor costs.
The independent variable in this study is managerial ownership (MGROWN). Three
measurements of managerial ownership are used. The main analysis defines managerial
ownership as the total percentage of executive directors’ shareholding. In order to get a
clear picture of the ownership characteristics of Malaysian companies, this study also
examines the effect of direct and indirect managerial shareholdings. The analysis was
re-estimated by re-defining this variable into percentage of executive directors’ direct
and indirect shareholdings only. The controlled variables include in the study are size,
complexity, debt structure, performance, risk, growth, listing status and industry.
The following model is used to analyze the relationship between the monitoring
costs and managerial ownership:
MONITOR ¼ ai 2 b1MGROWNi þ b2RECINV þ b3COMPLEXi þ b4SIZEi
þ b5DEBTSTRC þ b6RISKi þ b7ROAi þ b8GROWTHi
þ b9LISTSTATi þ b10CONSTRASEi þ b11INDPROPi þ 1i
where:
MONITOR ¼ natural logarithm of total monitoring costs which are the sum
of external and internal audit costs and non-executive
directors remuneration.
a ¼ intercept.
MGROWN ¼ percentage of executive directors’ shareholdings.
RECINV ¼ inventories and receivables/total assets.
COMPLEX ¼ natural logarithm of number of subsidiaries (including its
head-office).
SIZE ¼ natural logarithm of total assets.
DEBTSTRC ¼ long-term debt/market value of the firm.
RISK ¼ 1, if have loss in current year; and 0, otherwise.
ROA ¼ profit before interest and tax/total assets.
GROWTH ¼ market value of the firm/total assets.
LISTSTAT ¼ 1, if listed in the main board; and 0, otherwise.




INDPROP ¼ 1, if the company is in industrial, construction or property
sector; and 0, otherwise.
1i ¼ error term.
Results and discussions
Descriptive statistics
Table I presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study. Panel
A reports those results for continuous variables and Panel B presents those for
dichotomous variables. Panel A shows that non-executive directors’ remuneration
constitutes the largest component of monitoring costs, followed by internal and
external audit costs ranking second and third, respectively. The mean percentage of
shareholdings by the managers is about 27 per cent and the ratio of long-term debt to the
market value ranges from 0 to 93 per cent with the average close to 15 per cent. The
descriptive statistics also show that the sample companies cover a wide range of
companies, some moderately small and some relatively large, ranging from those with
RM18 to RM65,092 millions of total assets. The complexity of the companies in terms of
their operations range from simple, where there are companies with only their head
office with no subsidiary, to more complex. The complexity of their asset compositions
also reflect the same pattern, the ratio of inventories and receivables to total assets range
Variables No. of samples Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Panel A: continuous
variables
INTCOST (RM) 235 280,896 971,753 0 10,000,000
EXTCOST (RM) 235 263,487 732,805 15,000 9,700,000
NEDREMM (RM) 235 302,249 435,358 0 4,045,000
MONITOR (RM) 235 846,632 1,799,424 56,900 21,010,000
MGROWN 235 0.272734 0.2323824 0.0000 0.8637
DEBTSTRC 235 0.1468 0.1584435 0.0000 0.9328
RECINV 235 0.308798 0.1945093 0.0019 0.8046
COMPLEX 235 19.74 34.801000 1.0000 445.00
SIZE (RM) 235 1,564,597,791 5,679,828,495 18,261,685 65,092,100,000
ROA 235 0.010054 0.2258620 23.0172 0.2037
GROWTH 235 1.051495 0.7091715 0.3081 7.9680
Panel B: dichotomous
variables Yes % No %
LISTSTAT 235 175 75 60 25
RISK 235 46 20 189 80
CONTRASE 235 78 33 157 67
INDPROP 235 126 54 109 46
Notes: Variable definitions: INTCOST ¼ total internal audit cost in RM; EXTCOST ¼ total external
audit costs in RM; NEDREMM ¼ total NED remunerations in RM; MONITOR ¼ total monitoring
costs in RM; MGROWN ¼ executive directors’ shareholdings (per cent); DEBTSTRC ¼ long-term
debt to market value of the firm; RECINV ¼ ratio of inventories and receivables to total assets;
COMPLEX ¼ number of subsidiaries (including the head office); SIZE ¼ total assets in RM;
ROA ¼ ROA; GROWTH ¼ Tobin’s Q; RISK ¼ current year loss (dummy); LISTSTAT ¼ board
listing (dummy); CONSTRASE ¼ companies in consumer, trading and service sectors (dummy);







from 0.19 to 80 per cent and the average is about 31 per cent. On average, the respondent
companies have the total assets of RM1,564 millions and 20 subsidiaries, while the
average Tobins’ Q is approximately 1.05. Panel B reports that about 75 per cent of the
companies are listed on the main board of the Bursa Malaysia, and the balance on
the second board.
The results of standard tests on skewness and kurtosis in Table II indicate
that there is no problem with normality assumption[1]. A visual check for normality
using histogram and normal probability plots is also carried out. All the histograms
appear to be reasonably normally distributed and the normal distribution of the
probability plot forms a straight line and the values appeared to fall approximately
on this normality line. Thus, these variables can reasonably be considered as normally
distributed. In summary, the model does not violate the basic ordinary least squares
(OLS) assumptions and could be used to test the expected hypotheses.
Table III presents the correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and
control variables. As expected, managerial ownership is negatively correlated with total
monitoring costs. Also, larger and more complex companies are positively correlated to
monitoring costs. Overall, the result indicates that there is no multicollinearity problem,
as the correlations between the variables are below the threshold value of 0.8 (Gujarati,
2003, p. 359).
Main results. The primary result of the study is presented in Table IV. Column two of
Table IV presents the multiple regression analysis used to test the main model. The
adjusted R 2 for the model is 0.753 and the F-value of 66.022 is significant ( p , 0.000).
The value of the adjusted R 2 is very high, as well as statistically significant, which
suggests that it is a good predictive model of monitoring costs for Malaysian data.
It means more than 75 per cent of the variation in the monitoring costs can be explained
by the model. This adjusted R 2 is also very much higher compared to a similar study
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum SD Skewness Kurtosis
MONITOR 12.9841 10.949 16.861 1.0005 0.864 0.922
MGROWN 0.2727 0.0000 0.8637 0.2324 0.210 21.230
REVINV 0.3088 0.0019 0.8046 0.1945 0.329 20.888
COMPLEX 2.4998 1.0000 445.00 0.9091 0.232 1.430
RISK 0.2000 0 1 0.3980 1.544 0.386
SIZE 19.744 16.720 24.899 1.4171 0.911 0.887
DEBTSTRC 0.1468 0.0000 0.9328 0.1584 1.860 4.366
LISTSTAT 0.7400 0 1 0.4370 21.130 20.731
CONSTRASE 0.3300 0 1 0.4720 0.718 21.497
INDPROP 0.5400 0 1 0.5000 20.146 21.996
ROA 0.0101 23.0172 0.2037 0.2259 210.814 140.20
GROWTH 1.0515 0.3081 7.9680 0.7092 5.424 42.856
Notes: Variable definitions: MONIITOR ¼ total monitoring costs (ln); MGROWN ¼ executive
directors’ shareholdings (per cent); DEBTSTRC ¼ long-term debt to market value of the firm;
SIZE ¼ total assets (ln); COMPLEX ¼ number of subsidiaries (ln); RECINV ¼ ratio of inventories and
receivables to total assets; ROA ¼ ROA; RISK ¼ current year loss (dummy); GROWTH ¼ Tobin’s Q;
LISTSTAT ¼ board listing (dummy); CONSTRASE ¼ companies in consumer, trading and service




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































by Anderson et al. (1993) on monitoring cost, which use Australian data, where its
adjusted R 2 is 0.423.
The independent variable, managerial ownership appears to have significantly
negative relationship with monitoring costs as predicted by agency theory. This result
implies that the greater the managerial ownership in an organisation the lower is its total
monitoring costs. This finding is consistent with earlier studies in western countries by
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fleming et al. (2005), Ang et al. (2000), Jensen (1993), Niemi
(2005) and Friend and Lang (1986).
This result is also consistent with the convergence of interest model which claim that
an increase in the proportion of firm’s equity owned by insiders is expected to increase
firm value as the interest of inside and external shareholders are realigned, thus result
in less conflict among the shareholders. Furthermore, there will be less information
asymmetry and less hierarchical organisational structure as the managers are now the
owners, and are actively engaged in day-to-day activities of the organisations (Niemi,
2005). This is agreed by Ang et al. (2000) and Fleming et al. (2005), who claim that the
managers’ incentive to consume perquisites declines as their ownership share rises
because his share of the firm’s profits rises with ownership while his benefits from
perquisite consumption are constant. A local study by Mat Nor and Sulong (2007) also
argues along the same line by claiming that when managers own a smaller portion of the
organisation’s share, they have greater incentive to pursue personal benefits and less
incentive to maximise firm values.
Furthermore, this result may also be more pronounced in the Malaysian
unique concentrated business environment. Malaysia is unique because it is a
multiracial country. Sendut (1991) states that Malaysia is probably the only country in
the world which has its population mix maintaining their separate identities, preserving
their separate culture, behaviour patterns, different languages and architectural styles,
which makes Malaysia a varied and fascinating environment. Its population includes
people from different ethnic groups (such as Malays, Chinese, Indian, Kadazans, Bajau
and a few others), which have different culture and beliefs. In relation to businesses, it is
claimed that businesses by these ethnic groups in Malaysia are very concentrated,
especially those businesses controlled and owned by Chinese (Horii, 1991). It is also
claimed that owner-managed companies are common among listed companies in
Malaysia (Mat Nor and Sulong, 2007), especially with family businesses (Haniffa and
Hudaib, 2006). This claim is further supported by Ow-Yong and Guan (2000), who posit
that newly listed companies in Malaysia evolved from traditional family-owned
companies, and some of these companies continue to be managed as such. Another study
using Malaysian data also claimed that Malaysian businesses have a high degree of
ownership concentration where it was found 67.2 per cent of the sample companies
were controlled by families and managed by owner-managers (Liew, 2007). As their
businesses are owner-managed and family-controlled, their monitoring costs are
claimed to be lower than those controlled by non-family shareholders (Fleming et al.,
2005; Fama and Jensen, 1983b). This is due to the fact that families have a committed,
undiversified stake in the firm and this provides a strong incentive to monitor, as the
firm’s survival and its value maximization is important for them (Anderson et al., 2002;
Fleming et al., 2005). It is claimed that family businesses would normally prefer family
members in the management of the companies and utilize their influences and contacts




operational risks and lower transaction and agency costs (Che Ahmad, 2001). They tend
to place their family members in the top management positions of the business.
Further investigation of the companies in this study reveals that more than 51 per cent
of the sample companies are family-managed organizations which appoint the family
members as their directors and own the shares of the organizations. Of these, 41 per cent
are businesses controlled by Chinese who are said to belong to a cultural tradition of
ancestor worship normally derived from family businesses (Horii, 1991; Sendut, 1991).
Thus, as the managers are also the owners in these businesses, the organization
structure has lower information asymmetry, a less complex organization structure and
more committed staff, as they have incentives to monitor the firm, which will reduce the
need for assurance and monitoring.
This concentrated agency setting is also expected to result in low conflict among
the contracting parties (Fleming et al., 2005; Fama and Jensen, 1983b), and thus lead
to low risk (Francis and Wilson, 1988) and low monitoring costs. They tend to run the
businesses themselves or appoint family members, and they are concerned with the
survival of the organisations, not only over their lifetime, but also they are concerned
with the well-being of the next generation (Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, 2001). Thus,
they will really consider the monitoring costs incurred by the companies and the
allocation of the resources in order to ensure the future survival of the organisations.
The finding of this study is also consistent with earlier studies using Malaysian
data by Abdullah (2006) and Nikkinen and Sahlstrom (2004). Abdullah’s (2006) study
provides evidence that support the contention that ownership by non-executive
directors significantly increase their incentives to monitor management to ensure that
their wealth is taken care of. Nikkinen and Sahlstrom (2004) conduct an analysis on audit
pricing (one of the monitoring costs in this study) and its relationship with agency theory
by using data from seven countries including Malaysia. Consistent with the theory, they
find a significant negative relationship of managerial ownership with audit fees at
5 per cent level of confidence for Malaysian data.
Further tests. In order to get a clear picture of the ownership characteristics
of Malaysian companies, sensitivity analysis are also carried out. The proxy for
managerial ownership (MGROWN) is defined as the percentage of executive directors’
total shareholdings. As a test of sensitivity, the main model is re-estimated with the
independent variable MGROWN, redefined as the percentage of executive directors’
direct shareholdings only. The result for the model is not affected by this alternative.
As expected, in agency theory, the result in column three of Table IV appears to suggest
that the greater the direct managerial control in the organisation, the lower is the relative
expenditure in total monitoring.
Another test of sensitivity is conducted where MGROWN is redefined as the
percentage of executive directors’ indirect shareholdings only. Again, the result for the
model is not affected by this alternative. As expected, in agency theory, the result
indicates that indirect managerial control in the organization has an inverse relationship
with total monitoring costs (refer column four of Table IV).
Alternatively, the proxy for managerial ownership (MGROWN) is redefined as the
percentage of board of directors’ total shareholdings which includes both executive
and non-executive directors’ shareholdings. The result for the model in column five of
Table IV is not affected by this alternative. The result suggests that the greater the
managerial control (by both executive and non-executive directors) in the organization,
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the lower is the relative expenditure in total monitoring costs in directorship and
auditing. The direction of the relationship is as predicted in agency theory.
Further tests in column six and seven of Table IV are carried out by segmenting the
sample companies into:
(1) companies with high and low managerial shareholdings by using the average
managerial shareholdings in Table I as a cut-off point; and
(2) those companies which have managerial shareholdings and those with no
managerial shareholdings.
The main model is re-estimated using these alternatives. The re-estimated
results for both alternatives indicate that managerial ownership has negatively
significant relationship with monitoring costs at p , 0.01, while other variable remain
the same.
Independent t-tests are also carried out using the same segmented data in (1) and (2).
Both test results show significant results. The result of the test reveals that the monitoring
costs of companies which have high managerial shareholdings are significantly different
from those with low shareholdings (at p-value , 0.00). The average monitoring costs for
those with high and low shareholdings are RM533,436 and RM1,196,508, respectively.
The t-test result for those companies with and without managerial shareholdings is
also significant and shows the same pattern of result. The average monitoring costs of
companies which have managerial shareholdings is RM656, 491, which is less than
RM1,897,687, for those companies without such shareholdings.
Conclusions
This paper focuses on managerial ownership, as the mechanism used to align the
interests of managers and shareholders in Malaysian PLCs. It provides evidence of this
agency relationship in non-western country. The result reveals that consistent with
the earlier findings in western countries ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976; O’Sullivan, 2000;
Ang et al., 2000; Fleming et al., 2005; Nikkinen and Sahlstrom, 2004; Niemi, 2005),
managerial ownership is a significant factor in influencing the companies’ monitoring
costs. The result also suggests that managerial ownership in Malaysian companies has a
significant negative relationship with total monitoring costs as predicted by agency
theory and convergence of interest hypothesis. Sensitivity analysis conducted on the
direct managerial shareholdings only and indirect shareholdings only also reveal the
same pattern of results.
However, the conclusions drawn from this study should be interpreted in a limited
way, which would potentially represent opportunities for further investigation in future
research. First, this study is a cross sectional study, where it uses one-year of data in 2006
only. Future research could extend the study to include more years of data and thus
longitudinal studies can be conducted and further investigation on the impact of the
managerial ownership on the demand for monitoring mechanisms in the short- and
long-terms can be analyzed. Second, this study only examines one type of ownership
structure, which is the managerial ownership. Future research can also examine other
forms of ownership structure which is unique to Malaysian companies, such as family






1. The data are said to be normal if the standard skewness is within ^1.96 and standard
kurtosis is between ^3.0 (Mat Nor and Sulong, 2007; Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali,
2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006).
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